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NOTES
AGUA CALIENTE BAND OF CAHUILLA INDIANS V.
COACHELLA VALLEY WATER DISTRICT: A TRIBE’S
SUCCESSFUL FIGHT FOR FEDERALLY RESERVED
WATER RIGHTS
Alyssa Lankford*
Introduction
When the well’s dry, we know the worth of water.
– Benjamin Franklin1
The Ninth Circuit began its landmark opinion in Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District with this quote, not
merely for stylistic appeal, but to highlight the importance of the issue
discussed in the case: the allocation of water rights. The world currently
faces a global water crisis, with drinkable water supplies diminishing each
day.2 The Western United States provides a gleaming example of this crisis,
where the arid environment has all but eliminated surface water resources
and left the land in a permanent drought.3 Given the impact of the water
crisis on industries and individuals alike, parties increasingly turn to courts
to answer the crucial question: who possesses rights to the remaining
water?
The answer to this question implicates multiple parties, including state
water agencies, the federal government, and Indian tribes. States normally
create and enforce their own water law, with the federal government
granting them great deference in most issues.4 However, the doctrine of
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d
1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017).
2. See generally Water Scarcity, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://www.worldwildlife.
org/threats/water-scarcity (last visited Sept. 24, 2017).
3. See generally Dennis Dimick, 5 Things You Should Know About California’s Water
Crisis, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Apr. 6, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2015/04/
150406-california-drought-snowpack-map-water-science/; United States v. New Mexico,
438 U.S. 696, 699 (1978).
4. CYNTHIA BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32198, INDIAN RESERVED WATER
RIGHTS UNDER THE WINTERS DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW (2011).
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federal reserved water rights, which recognizes that the federal government
impliedly reserves water upon creating tribal reservations,5 “represents a
limited exception to the general rule that individual states govern water
rights.”6 Often referred to as the “Winters doctrine,” due to the historic
Supreme Court case first discussing this issue, these federally reserved
rights carry with them a type of seniority over state water rights.7
While state and federal courts have upheld the doctrine of federal
reserved water rights for the past century, many questions remain regarding
how to apply the doctrine today. One such question concerns whether a
tribe’s federally reserved water rights, if established, extend beyond surface
water to also encompass groundwater.8 In Agua Caliente, the Ninth Circuit
became the first federal appellate court to address this issue. However,
given the implications of the court’s decision on competing water rights, it
most likely will not be the last. Ambiguity surrounding the Winters doctrine
has left interested parties geared for litigation to preserve their increasingly
precious water rights in the face of extreme shortages in arid parts of the
country.9
This Note will examine the doctrine of federal reserved water rights,
known commonly as the Winters doctrine, with a focus on the recentlydecided Ninth Circuit case, Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v.
Coachella Valley Water District. Part I will provide the origin of tribes’
federally reserved water rights through discussion of three Supreme Court
cases on the doctrine, starting with Winters v. United States. Part II will
discuss Agua Caliente in detail, highlighting the factual scenario leading to
the litigation, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s novel application of the Winters
doctrine to groundwater. Part III will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
with emphasis placed on its determination regarding the role of United
States v. New Mexico in establishing the Tribe’s federally reserved water
right. Part III will also consider whether the court appropriately extended
the Winters doctrine to groundwater. Finally, Part IV will focus on the
impact of Agua Caliente on competing water rights.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET AL., 94 C.J.S. WATERS § 360 (2017).
BROUGHER, supra note 4.
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 142 (1976).
BROUGHER, supra note 4.
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I. The Legacy of the Doctrine of Federal Reserved Water Rights
Both the Commerce Clause and Property Clause of the United States
Constitution empower the federal government to reserve water rights for
specific purposes.10 While the doctrine of federal reserved water rights
applies to other federal enclaves, the application of the doctrine often
implicates tribal reservations.11 The landmark Supreme Court decision,
Winters v. United States, emphasizes the importance of the relationship
between tribes and federally reserved rights. In Winters, the federal
government sued on behalf of the tribes living on the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation to keep a group of settlers from obstructing the water of the
Milk River from reaching the reservation.12 On May 1, 1888, the federal
government established the Fort Belknap Reservation “as and for a
permanent home and abiding place of the Gros Ventre and Assiniboing
[tribes]”13 in an attempt to transform them from nomads to
agriculturalists.14 However, to achieve this goal on the reservation’s “dry
and arid” lands, the tribes, in conjunction with the federal government,
argued the necessity of allowing the “[Milk] river [to] flow down the
channel uninterruptedly and undiminished in quantity . . . .”15
Hoping to build dams on the Milk River to better utilize its water,16 the
settlers based their argument on the 1888 treaty establishing the reservation,
arguing the treaty “‘ceded, sold, transferred, and conveyed’ to the United
States all of the lands embraced in [the tribes’ former larger land holding],
except Fort Belknap Indian reservation.”17 From the settlers’ perspective,
the tribes no longer held title to the greater part of the land, which included
the parts of the Milk River on which they had settled.18 They therefore
argued that after the 1888 treaty, the federal government owned the land
and “[threw it] open to settlement” for individuals like themselves.19 In
their prayer for relief, the settlers emphasized the valueless nature of their
lands without access to the Milk River, stating that a lack of water would

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138.
BROUGHER, supra note 4.
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908).
Id.
Id. at 566-67.
Id.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 568.
Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018

206

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

inevitably force the dissolution of the communities and defeat “the purpose
and object of the government in opening said lands for settlement . . . .”20
Writing for the Court, Justice McKenna focused on the May 1888 treaty
in order to decipher the purpose of establishing the reservation.21 In doing
so, he recognized that the creation of the reservation intended to transform
the Tribes from nomads to “a pastoral and civilized people.”22 However, the
arid nature of the land, without water to support it, made it virtually
valueless.23 Because the Tribes could not accomplish the purpose of the
reservation without access to and use of the Milk River, Justice McKenna
found in favor of the Tribes and the federal government, holding that “the
United States intended to reserve sufficient water for the needs of
agriculture on the reservation.”24 This decision created the doctrine of
federal reserved water rights, or, the Winters doctrine: “[W]hen the Federal
Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a
federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant
water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose
of the reservation.”25
Over the next seventy years, the Winters doctrine remained relatively
intact, with only one prominent case discussing the quantification of
federally reserved water rights.26 Despite the passage of time, the Winters’
test for determining whether the federal government impliedly reserved
water rights when creating federally designated lands remained solid
precedent. Between 1976 and 1978, however, the Supreme Court issued
two decisions that broadened and subsequently narrowed the scope of the
Winters doctrine.27
In Cappaert v. United States, the Supreme Court decided whether the
status of Devil’s Hole as a national monument included impliedly reserved
20. Id. at 570.
21. Id. at 575.
22. Id. at 576.
23. Id.
24. Raphael J. Moses, The Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine–From 1866 Through
Eagle County, 8 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 221, 230 (1975).
25. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); see also BROUGHER, supra
note 4.
26. See generally Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (deciding the
quantification of water rights is no more than the amount necessary to fulfill the purposes of
the reservation).
27. 1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW § 5:36 (2d ed. 2007) (Federal Implied Reserved Water Rights – Cappaert
and New Mexico).
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federal water rights.28 Though not addressing a tribe’s water rights, the case
implicated the Winters doctrine because Devil’s Hole was designated as a
federal enclave. In 1952, President Truman made Death Valley “a national
monument ‘for the preservation of the unusual features of scenic, scientific,
and educational interest therein contained.’”29 The proclamation included
Devil’s Hole as part of the monument, given the cavernous pool’s unique
presence of a rare species of fish.30 In making the national monument,
President Truman declared that the presence of the fish made the pool “of
such outstanding scientific importance” that it required “special
protection.”31
Almost twenty years after President Truman designated the pool as part
of the national monument, defendant-petitioners began pumping
groundwater to support their nearby ranch, unknowingly pulling from an
aquifer that sourced Devil’s Hole.32 As a result, the water level in Devil’s
Hole decreased, placing the rare species of fish at risk of extinction.33 After
unsuccessfully litigating extensive state administrative proceedings, the
federal government sought an injunction limiting the Cappaerts’
groundwater pumping.34
While deciding whether President Truman had impliedly reserved a
federal water right when creating the national monument, the Supreme
Court in Cappaert reaffirmed the Winters doctrine, stating:
In determining whether there is a federally reserved water right
implicit in a federal reservation of public land, the issue is
whether the Government intended to reserve unappropriated and
thus available water. Intent is inferred if the previously
unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes
for which the reservation was created.35
Because President Truman specifically stated “‘the pool . . . should be
given special protection’” when designating Devil’s Hole as a national

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 131.
Id. at 132.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 133-34.
Id. at 134-35.
Id. at 139.
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monument, the Court found a federally reserved water right that trumped
state-created rights.36
One of the most significant aspects of Cappaert was the Court’s
discussion of whether the Winters doctrine applied to groundwater, marking
the first time the Supreme Court had addressed that question.37 The Court
determined that because “[the] doctrine is based on the necessity of water
for the purpose of the federal reservation,” the federal government could
protect its water “whether [it was] surface or groundwater.”38 However,
because the Court concluded Devil’s Hole contained surface water, the
precedential value of its extension of Winters to groundwater remained
uncertain.39
While the Court interpreted the Winters doctrine expansively in
Cappaert, just two years later, it seemingly reversed course. In United
States v. New Mexico, the federal government claimed reserved water rights
from the Rio Mimbres for recreation, stockwatering, and wildlife
preservation of a national forest.40 The Supreme Court started its opinion by
following the decision in Cappaert, emphasizing that because “the
President [has] the power to reserve portions of the federal domain for
specific federal purposes,” Congress had “impliedly authorized him to
reserve ‘appurtenant water [then] unappropriated to the extent needed to
accomplish the purpose of the reservation.’”41
The New Mexico Court, however, ultimately diverged from the
expansive Cappaert holding. Instead, it relied on Arizona v. California,
which quantified the amount of reserved water at no more than what was
“necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation,”42 to create a primarysecondary distinction for federally reserved water rights:

36. Id. at 140, 145.
37. Id. at 142.
38. Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 142-43; see also CONFERENCE OF W. ATTORNEYS GEN., AMERICAN INDIAN
LAW DESKBOOK § 8.12 (2018 ed.) [hereinafter AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK]
(“Miscellaneous issues- Groundwater”) (“[T]he Supreme Court held that a reserved right can
be protected from adjacent groundwater diversions. However, the reserved water right in
Cappaert was in an underground pool, which the Court characterized as ‘underground
surface water, and not groundwater.’”).
40. 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978).
41. Id. at 699-700 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138).
42. Id. at 700 (internal quotation omitted); see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
595-601 (1963).
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Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a
federal reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude,
even in the face of Congress’ express deference to state water
law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the
necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary
use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary
inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views,
that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as
any other public or private appropriator.43
The Court supported its finding of a primary-secondary distinction by
analyzing the Organic Administration Act of 1897, which established that
the federal government reserves national forests “‘[t]o conserve the water
flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for the people.’” 44
Additionally, the Court looked to the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of
1960 for Congress’s stated policy that national forests be administered “for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
purposes.”45
Although the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act proved Congress had
expanded the purposes of national forests after the inception of the Organic
Administration Act, the Court, the Court declined to establish federally
reserved water rights for these purposes because the Act provided “no
indication that [Congress] believed the new purposes to be so crucial as to
require a reservation of additional water.”46 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court refused to recognize a federally reserved water right for
stockwatering on the Rio Mimbres, given its status as a secondary purpose
in the creation of the national forest.47 The Court effectively required an
express reservation of water to establish federally reserved rights, rather
than using the Winters doctrine to determine whether water was impliedly
reserved to fulfill the purposes of the federally reserved lands.48
After two Supreme Court decisions on the Winters doctrine in a two-year
period, federal case law concerning impliedly reserved water rights
remained unchanged until the Ninth Circuit decided Agua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water District.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 702.
Id. at 707; see also COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 27.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 713.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 717.
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 27.
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II. Expanding Federally Reserved Water Rights to Groundwater
While the Agua Caliente Tribe’s occupation of the Coachella Valley
predates California’s statehood, two presidential executive orders in 1876
and 1877 formally created the reservation.49 The executive orders reserved
the land for “the permanent use and occupancy of the Mission Indians in
southern California,” and set aside additional land in 1877 for “Indian
purposes.”50 These orders followed government reports urging the creation
of reservations to allow tribes to settle and build homes on the land.51
Between these reports and the executive orders, the federal government
intended to “secure the Mission Indians permanent homes, with land and
water enough.”52
The nature of the Coachella Valley’s desert environment caused many
issues for establishing sustainable living conditions.53 Due to the minimal
rainfall and seasonally-fluctuating water levels produced by the Whitewater
River System, the area contains very little surface water.54 As a result, the
Coachella Valley Groundwater Basin, an aquifer beneath the valley, is the
main source of water for the region.55 This life-sustaining water basin does
not only provide water to the Agua Caliente Tribe, but also to “9 cities,
400,000 people, and 66,000 acres of farmland.”56 As demand for the
groundwater grows, the aquifer’s water level declines, despite efforts to
elevate water levels through groundwater pumping.57
Historically, the Tribe received minimal water from the local river
system under the Whitewater River Decree and fulfilled all other water
needs by purchasing it from the defendant water agencies.58 While this
agreement worked initially, the steadily declining groundwater levels
increased tensions regarding the use and control of the water.59
Accordingly, the Agua Caliente Tribe filed suit against the local water
agencies in May of 2013 to determine if it possessed a federally reserved
49. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d
1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 2017).
50. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1265-66 (internal quotation omitted).
53. Id. at 1266.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1267.
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right to the groundwater in the aquifer.60 Because multiple issues arose
from the suit, the parties elected to divide the litigation into three phases,
focusing only on the first phase in the immediate case. The first phase
addressed the Tribe’s potential federally reserved right to groundwater,
leaving later phases to address quality and quantification of any potential
rights.61
In March of 2015, the district court granted partial summary judgment to
the Tribe by holding “that the reserved rights doctrine applies to
groundwater and that the United States reserved appurtenant groundwater
when it established the Tribe’s reservation.”62 Without deciding Phase II
and III of the litigation, the district court granted an interlocutory appeal,
giving rise to the precedential Ninth Circuit decision.63
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Tribe’s claim of federally
reserved rights to groundwater in three steps. The first step focused on
whether the federal government impliedly reserved water when creating the
reservation.64 After reaffirming the Winters doctrine, the court turned to
whether the Tribe had any right to the area’s water, much less the
groundwater, at issue.65 The primary-secondary distinction in New Mexico
was central to this question. The defendant water agencies believed the
holding in New Mexico “that water is impliedly reserved only if other
sources of water then available cannot meet the reservation’s water
demands” mandated an additional inquiry to determine whether a reserved
right exists.66 In their view, “if other sources of water exist—and the lack of
a federal right would not entirely defeat the purpose of the reservation—
then Congress intended to defer to state water law . . . .”67
The court, however, disagreed with the water agencies’ narrow
interpretation of New Mexico. In its view, the New Mexico decision
remained true to the Winters doctrine, as the primary-secondary distinction
only affected the amount of water reserved.68 Ultimately, because the
primary-secondary distinction focused on quantification of a federally
reserved right, “it did not [] eliminate the threshold issue—that a reserved
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1269.
Id.
Id. at 1270.
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right exists if the purposes underlying a reservation envision access to
water.”69
Accordingly, the court sought to determine the purpose of the reservation
and the role of water in fulfilling that purpose.70 The executive orders
creating the reservation merely stated the federal government’s desire to
allow “permanent use and occupancy” of the land by the Tribe.71 From
these documents, the court recognized that “‘[t]he general purpose, to
provide a home for the Indians, is . . . broad . . . and must be liberally
construed.’”72 Noting the importance of water in sustaining the Tribe’s
ability to live in such an arid environment, the court determined that the
federal government established the reservation “to create a home for the
Tribe” and that “water was necessarily implicated in that purpose.”73
Therefore, a federally reserved water right existed from the creation of the
reservation..74
After determining the Agua Caliente Tribe had a federally reserved water
right, the court tackled the second step of their analysis: whether that right
extended to groundwater. To do so, the court focused on the
“appurtenance” requirement in Winters.75 In its view, the appurtenance
requirement only “limit[ed] the reserved right to those waters which are
attached to the reservation,” rather than restricting the rights to solely
surface water.76 The court supported this proposition with two sources.
First, the Cappaert Court’s discussion on federal protection of groundwater
eluded that “[i]f the United States can protect against groundwater
diversions, it follows that the government can protect the groundwater
itself.”77 Second, due to the lack of surface water in the western United
States and the need for that water in creating sustainable living conditions,
the inclusion of groundwater under Winters must occur if surface water
proves inadequate.78 Because of the reality facing tribes in arid parts of the
country, the court extended the Winters doctrine to appurtenant

69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1265 (internal quotation omitted).
72. Id. at 1270 (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th
Cir. 1981)).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1271.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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groundwater, meaning the Agua Caliente Tribe’s reserved water right
encompassed the Coachella Valley aquifer.79
Finally, in the third step of its opinion, the court addressed how the
Tribe’s federally reserved right to both surface and groundwater related to
state-created water rights. The state water agencies argued that the Tribe’s
state-created correlative rights and the water it received from the
Whitewater River Decree showed state law adequately protected the
purpose of the reservation, making a federally reserved right unnecessary. 80
The defendants’ arguments did not prevail, however, as the court found
federally reserved water rights preempt state water law.81
In sum, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that the
Agua Caliente Tribe obtained a federally reserved water right through the
establishment of their reservation.82 Most importantly, because Winters
“[did] not distinguish between surface water and groundwater,” the Ninth
Circuit became the first federal appellate court to extend these federally
reserved water rights to groundwater.83
III. Support for the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Agua Caliente
At its core, Agua Caliente focused on two important issues: whether the
Tribe had a federally reserved water right under Winters and whether that
right encompassed groundwater. Through its analysis, the Ninth Circuit
accurately interpreted New Mexico in finding a federally reserved water
right for the Tribe and appropriately extended the Winters doctrine to
encompass groundwater.
A. The Agua Caliente Tribe’s Federally Reserved Water Right
Before discussing the groundwater issue, the Ninth Circuit addressed
whether the Tribe even possessed a federally reserved water right. In
opposition to this notion, the defendant water agencies’ main argument
focused on the primary-secondary distinction in New Mexico, which they
believed allowed for a federally reserved right only if other sources of water
proved inadequate for serving the purpose of the reservation.84 Therefore,
“if other sources of water exist—and the lack of a federal right would not
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1271-72.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1269.
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entirely defeat the purpose of the reservation—then Congress intended to
defer to state water law . . . .”85 The Ninth Circuit found New Mexico
unpersuasive as to whether a federally reserved water right exists, leaving
the primary-secondary distinction analysis for quantifying any existing
water rights in Phase III.86
The Ninth Circuit properly refused to alter the Winters doctrine in light
of New Mexico for two reasons. First, the primary-secondary distinction
raised in New Mexico focuses on quantification of reserved water rights,
which does not occur in this case until Phase III of the litigation. Although
the distinction in New Mexico discusses the “purpose” requirement from
Winters, the classification of primary or secondary purposes implies that a
federally reserved water right must already exist under Winters. Because
the federally reserved right exists, courts can then use the New Mexico
distinction to determine the scope or quantity of the water right by labeling
the purposes as primary or secondary. In essence, the New Mexico
distinction serves as an additional step focusing on quantification that
comes after a court has recognized a federally reserved water right. The
issue presented in New Mexico supports the conclusion that the primarysecondary distinction serves as an additional inquiry on quantification,
asking “what quantity of water, if any, the United States reserved out of the
Rio Mimbres when it set aside the Gila National Forest . . . .”87 Ultimately,
as the Ninth Circuit held, the primary-secondary distinction “did not . . .
eliminate the threshold issue—that a reserved right exists if the purposes
underlying a reservation envision access to water.”88
Second, even if the New Mexico distinction altered the Winters doctrine
beyond giving guidelines on quantifying federally reserved rights, the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis in Agua Caliente mirrors the Court in New Mexico. In
New Mexico, the Court used prior legislative acts, such as the Organic
Administration Act of 1897, to show the federal government established
national forests “[t]o conserve the water flows, and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the people.”89 The Court determined that although
Congress enacted the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, which
broadened the purposes of national forests, Congress did not indicate “the
new purposes to be so crucial as to require a reservation of additional

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id. at 1270.
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 698 (1978) (emphasis added).
Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270.
New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 707 (internal quotation omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/6

No. 1]

NOTES

215

water.”90 Accordingly, the Court found a federally reserved water right to
sustain only the primary purposes of national forests.91
Following this same analysis, the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente
assessed the purpose of the reservation in determining whether a federally
reserved water right exists.92 From the executive orders stating the federal
government established the reservation for “the permanent use and
occupancy of the Mission Indians”93 in southern California, the court
determined that “‘water . . . would be essential to the life of the Indian
people.’”94 Unlike New Mexico, where conflicting legislative acts gave rise
to the possibility for primary and secondary purposes, the executive orders
and government reports surrounding the establishment of the reservation in
Agua Caliente clearly intended one primary purpose: to “create a home for
the Tribe.”95 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit properly concluded that
the Agua Caliente had a federally reserved water right under the Winters
doctrine and its subsequent cases, including New Mexico.
B. The Extension of Winters to Groundwater
Along with properly finding the Agua Caliente Tribe had a federally
reserved water right, the Ninth Circuit appropriately extended the Winters
doctrine to groundwater. To begin, an assessment of cases covering the
Winters doctrine shows a trend of multiple courts including groundwater in
tribes’ federally reserved rights.96 This trend began with Cappaert, where
although the Supreme Court did not explicitly rule on the groundwater
issue, it put forth the notion that the federal government had control over
implied water rights whether surface or groundwater.97
Following Cappaert, the Arizona Supreme Court in In re General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and

90. Id. at 715.
91. Id. at 718.
92. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270.
93. Id. at 1265 (internal quotation omitted).
94. Id. at 1270 (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 589-99 (1963)).
95. Id. (quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir.
1981)).
96. AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK, supra note 39; see, e.g., In re the General
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (Gila III), 989
P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968). But see In
re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753
P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988).
97. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976).
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Source decided a factually-similar case to Agua Caliente.98 The case
contained six parts, all of which focused on general stream adjudication.99
This part of the litigation (Gila III) discussed the groundwater question,
with the trial court finding that federal rights should extend to
groundwater.100 While affirming this holding, the Arizona Supreme Court
discussed the main arguments against extending federally reserved rights to
groundwater, countering with well-founded rationales as to why these
arguments were not persuasive. Because the Ninth Circuit’s holding in
Agua Caliente raises these same arguments, the Arizona Supreme Court’s
opinion in Gila provides an important starting point.
The state water agencies in Gila III began their opposition to extending
Winters to groundwater by urging the Arizona Supreme Court to not “apply
a federal doctrine so disjunctive to established doctrines of [Arizona law],”
given the United States Supreme Court had not explicitly done so.101
However, the Gila III court, while recognizing the impact of its holding,
felt it was not “writ[ing] on a blank slate,” but rather building on principles
set forth in Winters, Cappaert, and Arizona.102
To begin, the Arizona Supreme Court looked to Winters, where the
Supreme Court realized the necessity of an implied reservation of water due
to the Fort Belknap Reservation’s inability to sustain an agricultural
lifestyle without it.103 The Gila III court highlighted that, like the Fort
Belknap Reservation, other reservations “depend for present or future
survival substantially or entirely upon pumping of underground water.”104
From the court’s view, whether the water came from a stream or river, as it
did in Winters, or from underground, the federal government must have
intended to reserve “water necessary to sustain life.”105 Therefore, the court
determined that “if the United States implicitly intended, when it
established reservations, to reserve sufficient unappropriated water to meet
the reservations’ needs, it must have intended that reservation of water to
come from whatever particular sources each reservation had at hand.”106
Ultimately, the Gila III court slightly limited its holding by only finding a
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Gila III, 989 P.2d at 741.
Id. at 742.
Id. at 742-43.
Id. at 745.
Id. at 745-46.
Id. at 746 (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 569 (1908)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
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right to groundwater where surface water could not fulfill the purpose of the
reservation.107
The arguments and holding from Gila III bolster the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Agua Caliente. From a logistical standpoint, if a federally
reserved water right exists because the purpose of the reservation could not
be fulfilled without water, it therefore follows that those rights should
encompass any available water. Specifically, if a federally reserved water
right exists in a land with little to no surface water, as in Gila and Agua
Caliente, the refusal to extend Winters to groundwater would in effect
eliminate or make useless a tribe’s federally reserved water right. Like
Gila III, the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente found that “survival is
conditioned on access to water—and a reservation without an adequate
source of surface water must be able to access groundwater.”108
A further reading of the Gila III opinion also gives guidance on why
deference to state water law could inhibit federally reserved water rights. It
is well-established that “[reserved water] rights are paramount to water
rights later perfected under state law.”109 However, courts narrowly
construe the Winters doctrine to preserve states’ rights in this area.110 To
balance these competing interests, courts must use the following assessment
to determine whether to defer to state law: “Where federal rights are at
issue, a state court may adopt state law as the rule of decision if to do so
would not frustrate or impair a federal purpose.”111 Accordingly, the state
water agencies in Gila III argued that due to the state’s riparian water
system, which “provides all overlying landowners an equal right to pump as
much groundwater as they can put to reasonable use,” no need existed to
reserve additional groundwater.112 Therefore, deference to state water law
would not “frustrate or impair”113 federally reserved rights.114
However, the Gila III court again disagreed, pointing to the nature of
federally reserved water rights. Because federally reserved water rights
intend “‘to satisfy the future as well as the present needs of the Indian
107. Id. at 750.
108. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d
1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2017).
109. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 19.03[1], at 1210 (Nell Jessup
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
110. AMENDOLA ET AL., supra note 6.
111. Gila III, 989 P.2d at 747 (quoting United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S.
715, 728-29 (1979)).
112. Id. at 747-48.
113. Id. at 747 (quoting Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29).
114. Id. at 748.
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Reservations,’”115 the current equal right to pump groundwater does not
prevent future overuse of groundwater to which tribes hold federally
reserved rights.116 After finding Arizona’s “reasonable use” doctrine had
allowed consumption of “far more groundwater than nature [could]
replenish,” the Gila III court “[could not] conclude that deference to
Arizona’s law—and to the opportunity it extends all landholders to pump as
much groundwater as they can reasonably use—would adequately serve to
protect federal rights.”117
Like Arizona, California’s water system operates on a type of correlative
rights framework.118 When specifically looking at groundwater, the state of
California utilizes a riparian water system that, like Arizona, allows for
groundwater pumping for any water landowners can put to “reasonable
use.”119 Accordingly, like the system the Arizona Supreme Court addressed
in Gila III, under California’s water system, “if the quantity of water in the
basin were deemed insufficient, the Tribe would receive only its
‘proportionate fair share’ of water based ‘on [its] current reasonable and
beneficial need for water.’”120 From this framework, a possibility exists that
the Tribe’s proportionate fair share of water under California water law
might not be enough to “fulfill the purpose of the reservation.”121 Therefore,
because state law might not be able to adequately protect the Agua Caliente
Tribe’s federally reserved water right into the future, deference to state
water law impairs the purpose of those rights and should not occur.
Overall, while state court decisions like Gila III do not bind federal
courts, their analyses support the growing trend to extend the Winters
doctrine to groundwater, as the Ninth Circuit did in Agua Caliente.

115. Id. (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600 (1963)).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Dale Ratliff, A Proper Seat at the Table: Affirming a Broad Winters Right to
Groundwater, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 239, 243 (2016).
119. The Water Rights Process, CAL. ST. WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,
https://www.waterboards.ca.gov/waterrights/board_info/water_rights_process.shtml
(last
visited Jan. 5, 2018). See generally Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
120. Ratliff, supra note 118, at 257 (quoting Tehachapi-Cummings Cty. Water Dist. v.
Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)).
121. Ratliff, supra note 118, at 257.
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IV. The New Era of Federally Reserved Water Rights
Because federally reserved rights under the Winters doctrine “are
paramount to water rights later perfected under state law,”122 the extension
of this doctrine to groundwater by the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente
impacts not only tribes and water agencies in California, but all entities
involved in water distribution across the nation. On a local scale, while
interested parties understand tribes’ federally reserved rights trump state
water rights, it is unclear how this holding will impact California’s
groundwater allocation system.123
To begin, California’s unique water law system utilizes prior
appropriation for surface water, meaning “the first party to use water from a
stream or river obtain[s] a priority right.”124 However, for groundwater,
California follows a riparian system and “reasonable use” requirement
previously described in Part III. Despite these state water law principles,
because federally reserved water rights are superior to state-created water
rights,125 the Tribe effectively has gained the only priority right over all
other groundwater users governed by the state’s riparian system.126
The priority groundwater rights of tribes stemming from the Ninth
Circuit’s decision brought mixed reviews. Many tribal leaders, including
Agua Caliente Tribal Chair Jeff Grubbe, praised the Ninth Circuit’s ruling
for making the reservation’s federally reserved right “settled law.”127 From
the Tribe’s view, the case focused on giving the Tribe “a seat at the table”
to make decisions about the aquifer, including whether to treat the imported
Colorado River water and how to utilize their priority right.128
While local tribes celebrate the favorable Ninth Circuit ruling, state and
local water agencies have expressed serious concerns about the Tribe’s new
priority right to groundwater. Because “many areas of the western United

122. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 109, § 19.03[1], at 1210.
123. Ian James, Supreme Court Won’t Hear California Water Agencies’ Appeal in
Tribe’s Groundwater Case, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.) (Nov. 27, 2017),
http://www.desertsun.com/story/news/environment/2017/11/27/supreme-court-wont-hearwater-agencies-appeal-tribes-groundwater-case/897469001 [hereinafter James, Supreme
Court Won’t Hear Appeal].
124. Id.
125. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 109, § 19.03[1], at 1210.
126. James, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Appeal, supra note 123.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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States rely on groundwater as their only viable water source,”129 allowing
tribes priority could have both economic and environmental impacts on
local water use. According to the Desert Water Agency (DWA), “[t]he
Agua Caliente does not have any pipes, pumps, infrastructure or expertise
in water management,”130 meaning it could propose economically
insensitive solutions to potential issues. For example, when assessing the
Agua Caliente Tribe’s concern regarding the untreated Colorado River
water entering the aquifer, Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD)
experts’ only solutions yield costs of up to $450 more per year to the
average consumer.131 Despite these costs, the Tribe continues to question
the use of Colorado River water without providing other cost-efficient
alternatives.132
Agua Caliente also raised questions regarding how local consumers will
obtain groundwater for routine utilities. DWA warned that not only could
the Tribe unilaterally set the price for water sold to fulfill public utility
needs, requiring the DWA and CVWD to raise consumers’ rates, but that
“Coachella Valley residents could find themselves solely reliant on
imported water supplies to satisfy their household needs.”133 Because the
Tribe’s priority right will likely limit the water agencies’ access to
groundwater, consumers could face “substantial cutbacks in water delivered
to customers, higher rates, potential building moratoriums and damage to
the region’s economy.”134
The impact of the Agua Caliente holding is even broader than the
previously mentioned local concerns. Observers saw this wide-reaching
impact before the Ninth Circuit decided the case, as approximately forty
tribes and tribal organizations filed an amicus brief supporting the Agua
Caliente Tribe.135 Likewise, ten different states supported the water districts
through an amicus brief, writing that all states “[have] an obvious stake in
the preservation, maintenance and allocation of their most precious natural

129. Ian James, Water Agencies Aim for Supreme Court, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs,
Cal.), Mar. 30, 2017, at A06 [hereinafter James, Water Agencies Aim for Supreme Court].
130. Water Rights Lawsuit, DESERT WATER, https://dwa.org/about-us/other/lawsuits/100water-rights-lawsuit (last visited Jan. 5, 2018).
131. Jim Barrett & Dave Luker, Valley Voice: If Suit Succeeds, Tribe Profits and You
Lose Rights, DESERT SUN (Palm Springs, Cal.) (May 25, 2013), https://www.cvwd.
org/DocumentCenter/View/2466.
132. Id.
133. Water Rights Lawsuit, supra note 130.
134. Id.
135. James, Supreme Court Won’t Hear Appeal, supra note 123.
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resource.”136 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s historic decision has given
tribes “legal backing to assert rights to groundwater, which could in turn
strengthen their positions in negotiations or court-administered
adjudications divvying up water supplies.”137
Conclusion
Federally reserved water rights for Indian tribes have been an important,
yet somewhat contentious, area of law since the advent of the Winters
doctrine in 1908. Many federal and state cases have focused on the scope
and nature of these rights, all leading to the Ninth Circuit’s landmark
decision in Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley
Water District. In Agua Caliente, the Ninth Circuit’s decision to extend the
doctrine of federal reserved rights to groundwater correctly interpreted
precedent, including United States v. New Mexico, while balancing both
policy concerns and the division of responsibilities between the states and
federal government. Through the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the Agua
Caliente tribe gained a priority right to groundwater, bringing with it many
triumphs for tribes and concerns for state water agencies. As the global
water crisis continues and litigation increases over who possesses rights to
the remaining water, the answer, while still uncertain, now clearly indicates
one party: tribes.

136. Id.
137. James, Water Agencies Aim for Supreme Court, supra note 129.
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